Providing nuclear-powered submarines to Australia would diminish the US navy’s own fleet for “many years”, a new report for the US Congress has cautioned, questioning whether Australian-flagged vessels could be compelled into service in a conflict with China.
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vessels → provide → China
The US navy’s latest shipbuilding plan does not countenance the Aukus agreement in its forecasts at all, noting only in a footnote that the transfer of any Virginia-class submarine to Australia “has not been factored into the plan”, the report says.
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report → countenance → plan
But the Congressional Budget Office has evaluated the impact of Aukus, releasing detailed analysis on Friday morning, finding “the US submarine industrial base is currently struggling to meet the Navy’s demand for submarines”.
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base → evaluate → submarines
“Increasing production further to replace SSNs [attack submarines] sold to Australia would increase the challenges that the Navy and the shipyards are facing,” the report found.
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report → increase → that
“The sale of SSNs to Australia would reduce the number of attack submarines available to the Navy for many years.”
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sale → reduce → years
Under the so-called “Pillar One” of Aukus, the US has agreed to sell between three and five in-service Virginia-class submarines to Australia, beginning in 2032.
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US → call → 2032
The CBO analysis questioned whether any submarines transferred to Australia could be utilised in the event of a US conflict with China.
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submarines → question → China
“Would China be less deterred if the United States reduced the number of its attack submarines to help Australia develop its own submarine force?
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Australia → deter → force
The report argued that because of the longstanding, and robust, alliance between the US and Australia, boosting the Australian navy’s submarine fleet could help offset the US Navy’s “potential loss of capability”.
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boosting → argue → capability
“That loss might even be more than offset because the Australian submarines would be based in the Western Pacific region and therefore could respond more quickly to any conflict with China over Taiwan or other issues in the South China Sea
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submarines → offset → Sea
“However, Australia would control its own submarines, and their participation in any particular conflict would not be guaranteed.”
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participation → control → conflict
In 2023, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, said Australia would make no promises it would deploy its submarines in support of any US conflict with China, and that any future Australian submarines would be “under the complete control of the Australian government of the day”.
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submarines → say → day
The country’s shipyards are currently producing Virginia-class submarines at a rate of 1.13 a year: that rate needs to lift that to two submarines a year to service America’s own needs, and 2.33 a year to have additional boats to transfer to Australia.
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rate → produce → Australia
The CBO report said submarine-building rates had slowed over the past two decades, and Virginia-class submarines were delayed between 24 and 36 months.
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submarines → say → decades
“Building … submarines took five to six years in the 2000s but now takes an average of 10 to 11 years, according to current schedules.”
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Building → build → schedules
The US legislation governing Aukus states that the president of the US can only transfer a submarine to Australia if losing that submarine from US service “will not degrade the United States undersea capabilities”.
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losing → govern → capabilities
The US can refuse to transfer any submarines to Australia without penalty, under the terms of the Aukus agreement.
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US → refuse → agreement
Critics of Aukus have said there is vanishingly little chance the US will have the capacity to sell any of its in-service submarines to Australia.
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US → say → Australia
The former foreign affairs minister Bob Carr told Guardian Australia both countries were “living a lie” in upholding the fiction that the submarine deal would happen.
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deal → tell → fiction
“It’s now conventional wisdom in Washington as well as in Canberra that we’re not going to get the subs.
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we → ’ → subs
But the deal has avowed, bipartisan broad political support across both the US and Australia.
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deal → have → US
Marles said earlier this month: “Aukus is happening, our alliance is happening, and all of that continues unimpeded.”
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all → say → that
Pete Hegseth, the US secretary of defense, affirmed his support for the Aukus agreement, and the two countries’ commitment “to advance the alliance and strengthen deterrence in the Pacific” at a meeting with Marles in September.
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Hegseth → affirm → September
The US Congressional Research Service has openly countenanced an “alternative division of labour” under which no Virginia-class submarines are ever transferred to Australian control.
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submarines → countenance → control
The research service’s latest report on Aukus, issued in January, considered a revision of the Aukus deal under which the submarines earmarked for sale to Australia were instead retained under US command to be sailed out of Australian bases.
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submarines → issue → bases
The report argued both for and against the US selling three Virginia-class submarines to Australia, beginning in 2032.
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US → argue → 2032
But it makes the case that, in the event of a “conflict or crisis” with China over Taiwan, submarines under Australian command could not be ordered into operation, whereas US-commanded vessels, operated out of Australian bases, could be immediately deployed.
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vessels → make → bases