I appreciate that many people are skeptical about judges.
asserted
people → appreciate → judges
Indeed, it's good that people take with a grain of salt the statements of government officials, including judges.
asserted
people → take → judges
Judges are human, and humans make mistakes and have prejudices and blind spots.
asserted
humans → make → prejudices
At the same time, judges are generally quite well-trained lawyers, and know a good deal about what they're writing about.
asserted
they → train → what
Conventional wisdom holds that federal judges generally are particularly well-qualified (of course, with exceptions, as is true for all institutions).
asserted
judges → hold → institutions
Federal judges also generally employ quite well-qualified law clerks, who do much of the research and initial opinion drafting.
asserted
who → employ → research
This means that, for all the risk of error and ideological bias, judges generally (though not always) know what they're talking about in their legal analysis.
asserted
they → mean → analysis
They tend to particularly know more than non-lawyers, but also often more than lawyers who aren't specialists in the particular field.
asserted
who → tend → field
You might assume that some judge is "woke" or "Trumpy" or what have you, but there's a pretty good chance that the judge's legal analysis is still correct.
uncertain
analysis → assume → what
This post was prompted by a comment I saw on the Eric Coomer (of Dominion Voting) Loses Libel Lawsuit over The Deep Rig post, though this is just one example of a broader trend.
asserted
this → prompt → trend
The comment quotes an excerpt from the post's excerpt of the judge's opinion:
asserted
comment → quote → opinion
In short, if the law did not require "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements, it is likely that Byrne's motion for summary judgment would have been denied, and a jury would have had the opportunity to weigh in on this matter.
asserted
jury → require → matter
However, under the law as it currently stands, Coomer's evidence is insufficient to meet these standards and summary judgment for Byrne is therefore required….
asserted
judgment → stand → Byrne
The comment then says, "Trumpy judge who apparently didn't bother to read Sullivan, which states" (emphasis added by commenter),
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
And the comment continues, "Seems like this is ripe for appeal.
asserted
this → say → appeal
This Trumpy judge seems to think the current precedent requires that the defendant 'subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements,' when Sullivan has a looser standard."
asserted
Sullivan → seem → standard
The trouble with the commenter's analysis is that Sullivan was of course not the last word on the subject—as the judge knew.
asserted
judge → know → subject
Indeed, if one searches for "subjective" in the judge's opinion, one sees a longish passage citing authority supporting the judge's analysis:
Actual malice requires proof that the defendant published the challenged statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false.
asserted
it → search → disregard
Thus, the issue is not whether "a reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have investigated before publishing," but rather whether the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication, or was highly aware of its probable falsity[.]" Coomer, 552 P.3d at 591; Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. The Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103. 1105-10 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 703 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e ask whether the defendant, instead of acting in good faith, actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or was highly aware that the account was probably false."); Dershowitz v. Cable News Network, Inc., 153 F.4th 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2025) ("[A]ll that matters are the speakers' subjective beliefs about the truth of their own statements.").
St. Amant, cited by the court, indeed states,
[The precedents] are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
asserted
man → publish → court
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
asserted
defendant → permit → publication
Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
asserted
Publishing → publish → malice
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) expressly quotes this passage as the Court having "equated reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity."
asserted
Court → quote → falsity
The judge in the Coomer / Deep Rig case, whether you view him as "Trumpy" or not, knew the law here, and the commenter (who had elsewhere said he wasn't a lawyer) didn't seem to.
asserted
he → view → law
But don't assume that just because you know one precedent in the field you know the law better than the judge.
asserted
you → assume → judge
Don't assume that just because you think the judge has some ideological bias, that ideological bias has led the judge into legal error.
asserted
bias → assume → error
And if you have some skepticism about the judge's analysis, check the sources that the judge cites in the full opinion; my posts usually just excerpt the opinion, and often don't include citations, but they generally link to the full opinion so readers can consult it directly.
asserted
readers → have → it
The Aporia