As fears of regional escalation grew after US strikes on Iran, US President Donald Trump claimed the US-Israel war with Iran was "effectively over" on November 9 at a White House briefing.
asserted
war → grow → briefing
"We're just keeping it the status quo."
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We → keep → it
Periods of heightened public interest, such as the conflict involving Iran, create fertile ground for so-called content farms.
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Periods → heighten → farms
Following Trump's statement, posts on the Iran war surged online again.
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posts → follow → war
And a growing network of accounts claiming links to Iran's military has accumulated millions of views.
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network → grow → views
DW Fact Check examined a number of these accounts and found recurring signs of content farm behavior.
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Check → examine → behavior
Experts who reviewed the accounts DW provided describe them as part of a broader ecosystem of pro-Iran content aggregators that connect across multiple social media platforms.
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that → review → platforms
Content farms are websites or social media accounts, or a network of either, producing large amounts of cheap content in a short time span.
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farms → produce → span
They may be driven by economic incentives, but they can also serve as vehicles for political influence campaigns.
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they → drive → campaigns
The internet watchdog NewsGuard has found 165 false claims about the Iran warthat collectively have been watched hundreds of millions of times.
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watchdog → find → times
Only a few of them originated from Iranian state media.
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few → originate → media
NewsGuard identified the majority as pushing a pro-Iran agenda, shifting toward AI-generated images, and increasingly claiming that accurate stories from authentic media are AI-generated and false.
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stories → identify → media
An analysis by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) identified pro-Iran networks of X accounts which revealed signs of coordination, cross-promotion and engagement tactics while spreading misleading and AI-generated war content.
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which → base → content
It found no links to state-affiliated actors.
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It → find → actors
Several accounts identified by DW Fact Check use the Iranian flag as their profile picture and a variation of "Iran Military" in their username.
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accounts → identify → username
While ownership cannot always be verified, they share recurring characteristics commonly associated with content farms.
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they → verify → farms
A network reaching millions
Content farms use repetitive and formulaic posting formats, as they are cheaper and easier to produce.
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they → reach → formats
Their posts frequently start with the word "BREAKING" and imitate the appearance of news updates on the conflict.
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posts → start → conflict
One account, called "Iran Military Media," is linked to a Facebook account that Iranian state media have verified as authentic.
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media → call → that
It has built a substantial audience across multiple social media platforms, with over 290,000 followers on X, 597,000 on Facebook and 17,200 followers on Instagram.
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It → build → Instagram
It posts a handful of times a day, often sharing AI-generated or AI-enhanced videos and frequently adopting the "BREAKING" format.
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It → post → format
Since late 2025, it has published more than 1,600 posts on X, generating over 150 million views and 3.6 million likes.
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it → publish → views
"The accounts discussed are a central part of this ecosystem as they distribute the pro-Iranian content, state and non-state allied media at relatively low cost and generate millions of views," said Moustafa Ayad, an expert in online influence operations at the ISD.
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Ayad → discuss → ISD
Iran's 'soft war'
Ayad examined 10 similar "Iran Military"-themed accounts during the same period, and their combined reach is even greater.
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reach → examine → period
Together, they accounted for 12,588 posts, 353 million views and 6.6 million likes.
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they → account → posts
This network is replicated on Facebook in numerous languages.
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network → replicate → languages
According to Ayad, this strategy is part of what the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outlined as "soft war."
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Khamenei → accord → war
Ayad said the accounts' reach is amplified when they are paired with other accounts.
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they → say → accounts
Only a small share of "Iran Military Media's" 150 million views came from reposted content.
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share → come → content
A second account, "Iranian Force," has amassed more than 248,000 followers.
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account → amass → followers
It typically posts around 10 times a day, though on some days the volume exceeds 30 posts.
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volume → post → posts
Like "Iran Military Media," it frequently relies on "BREAKING" alerts and AI-generated content.
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it → rely → alerts
It also includes genuine footage, often framed through a pro-Iran lens.
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It → include → lens
X lists the account as being based in Pakistan and its profile history shows six username changes.
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history → list → changes
In a break from the Iran-related content, one post suddenly defends a Pakistani TikToker and includes an appeal in Urdu to the government in Pakistan.
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post → relate → Pakistan
Charlene Lin, an analyst for the internet watchdog NewsGuard, told DW it had flagged this account for multiple false narratives.
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it → tell → narratives
According to Lin, it is also linked to another account that spreads the same false narratives in coordination.
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that → accord → coordination
A third account, called the "Iran Army," posts a handful of times a day, including AI-generated videos.
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account → call → videos
Its posts regularly reach tens and at times hundreds of thousands of views.
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posts → reach → views
Like "Iranian Force," it distributes videos from official briefings by the Iranian Armed Forces while also using the "BREAKING" format to drive engagement.
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it → distribute → engagement
…and 14 more, not listed.