Pro-Palestine protests have spread across several Moroccan cities, with demonstrators demanding an end to diplomatic normalisation with Israel as Rabat deepens ties with Tel Aviv.
asserted
Rabat → spread → Aviv
The latest mobilisation took place on September 27, at the end of three days of action called by the Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Against Normalisation.
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mobilisation → take → Normalisation
They followed a September 16 announcement that Morocco and Israel would elevate their diplomatic missions to full embassies and appoint ambassadors.
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Morocco → follow → ambassadors
On September 25, the Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes said it had organised 76 events in 45 cities under the slogan “Friday for Al-Aqsa and against normalisation”.
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it → support → normalisation
Moroccan media reported gatherings in cities including Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier, Fez, Agadir, Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra and Sale.
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media → report → Rabat
In Rabat, protesters gathered outside Parliament, while a demonstration in Marrakesh developed into a march through several main streets, according to Lakome.
uncertain
demonstration → gather → Lakome
Moroccan media also reported restrictions and arrests in some cities.
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media → report → cities
The mobilisation faced restrictions in some cities.
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mobilisation → face → cities
In Tangier, local authorities issued a decision banning a planned demonstration on September 27.
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authorities → issue → September
Achkayen later reported that security forces dispersed hundreds of participants and that more than 12 people were detained, citing its own sources.
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people → report → sources
Lakome reported that authorities also prevented demonstrations in M’diq, while security forces surrounded a gathering in Agadir to prevent it from becoming a march.
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forces → report → it
The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes subsequently condemned what it described as bans, restrictions and arrests.
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it → support → bans
The response underscored another dimension of the dispute: Opposition to the relationship with Israel has remained visible on the streets, even as the government has continued to develop official ties.
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government → underscore → ties
A relationship under public pressure
Morocco restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords framework, alongside Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
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Morocco → restore → Sahara
On September 16, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz.
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Bourita → meet → Waltz
The three countries confirmed plans to elevate the Moroccan and Israeli diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors.
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countries → confirm → embassies
Morocco and Israel also agreed to conclude agreements on investment protection and avoiding double taxation, expand direct flights and organise high-level reciprocal visits.
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Morocco → agree → visits
The move therefore goes beyond maintaining diplomatic relations established in 2020.
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move → go → 2020
It sets out a broader programme of institutional, economic and transport links between the two countries.
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It → set → countries
For opponents of the relationship, the embassy agreement represents another step in a policy they have rejected since 2020.
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they → represent → 2020
Public opinion and state policy
Morocco has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel while continuing to publicly support the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
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Morocco → maintain → state
“What has changed is the political context: Normalisation is being consolidated at a time when the war in Gaza has generated unprecedented public anger and intense images of Palestinian suffering,” Kathya K Berrada, senior programmes manager at the Arab Center for Research, told Al Jazeera.
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Berrada → change → Jazeera
“What we are seeing in Morocco is a growing disconnect between official diplomacy and public sentiment,” Moroccan activist Mouna Rahiani said, citing the latest Arab Opinion Index, which found that 89 percent of Moroccans surveyed opposed their country recognising Israel, while six percent supported it.
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percent → see → it
“While the state is moving towards deeper and more formal relations with Israel, Moroccans are still taking to the streets to say that Palestine cannot be treated as separate from our political and moral responsibilities,” she said.
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she → move → responsibilities
The September agreement has brought an existing tension into sharper focus: public mobilisation against normalisation continues while the state pursues closer institutional ties with Israel.
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state → bring → Israel
Berrada said there was an important distinction between official policy and popular opinion, arguing that there is not enough reliable public data to establish how many Moroccans support or oppose normalisation.
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Moroccans → say → normalisation
Western Sahara adds another layer
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Sahara → add → layer
The timing also matters for Morocco’s Western Sahara policy.
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timing → matter → policy
The United Nations Security Council is due to consider the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October.
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Council → consider → October
Its current mandate runs until October 31, 2026.
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mandate → run → October
The September 16 trilateral statement came against the backdrop of US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israel’s support for Morocco’s position on the territory.
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statement → come → territory
For Rabat, the relationship with Israel sits within a wider foreign-policy framework in which ties with Washington and international support for its position on Western Sahara remain important.
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ties → sit → Sahara
For opponents of normalisation, however, that strategic calculation does not resolve their objection to closer ties with Israel, particularly while the Palestinian issue remains highly salient.
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issue → resolve → Israel
Ahmed, a Moroccan sociologist who asked to be identified by one name, said the September 16 move was “a continuation of the trilateral agreement of December 10, 2020”, but that Morocco should make the relationship “comprehensive, not selective or partial”.
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relationship → ask → December
The election changes the political backdrop
The protests came days after Morocco held parliamentary elections on September 23.
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Morocco → change → September
The final results gave the Authenticity and Modernity Party 97 of the 395 seats, followed by the National Rally of Independents with 66, the Istiqlal Party with 65 and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) with 54.
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results → give → 54
The PJD had won 13 seats in 2021.
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PJD → win → 2021
Turnout was 38.08 percent, compared with 50.86 percent in 2021 and 42.27 percent in 2016, according to Morocco’s Ministry of Interior.
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Turnout → compare → Interior
It was the PJD in power when Morocco restored relations with Israel in 2020.
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Morocco → restore → 2020
Then-Prime Minister Saadeddine el-Othmani signed the Morocco-US-Israel joint declaration that December.
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Othmani → sign → declaration
…and 19 more, not listed.
The Aporia
