How Iran used data from social media, fitness apps and satellites to target U.S. bases
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Iran → use → bases
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- Iran scraped data from social media, fitness apps and mapping services — alongside satellite imagery — to learn about a military base’s rhythm, including shift rotations and meal times.
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Iran → scrap → rotations
The Pentagon is restricting location data and urging troops to tighten online habits.
- In the first six months of the war, Iran targeted 26 U.S. military sites in the Middle East and even hotels where U.S. personnel had been evacuated.
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personnel → restrict → East
When Iran’s military planners prepared to hit American bases in the Middle East, they relied on intelligence from an unlikely source: U.S. service members themselves.
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they → prepare → source
According to security experts and even the U.S. military, Iran harvested data from social media accounts, fitness apps and even ads to establish patterns of life in U.S. bases across the region.
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Iran → accord → region
Paired with imagery reportedly provided by Russian satellites, the Iranians selecting the targets constructed a surprisingly accurate picture of where U.S. troops assembled and where to strike.
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troops → pair → picture
The result, seen in fusillades of drones and missiles that — despite many interceptions — found their mark, leaving more than a dozen service members dead and hundreds of others wounded and causing billions in damage to facilities and equipment.
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that → see → facilities
The full scope of the carnage, and what it means for the viability of the United States’ long-term presence in the Middle East, is still being assessed.
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it → mean → East
The campaign has left U.S. forces vulnerable, has depleted critical weapons and has failed to establish control of vital waters.
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campaign → leave → waters
As President Trump considers a new offensive and the specter of a widened Iranian retaliation looms over the region, the U.S. military is scrambling to move or hide assets while service members struggle to counter what experts call an era of ubiquitous technical surveillance (or UTS) and reduce digital footprints that have proved all too easy to track.
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that → consider → footprints
In recent months, congressional pressure on the military pushed several branches to disable mobile advertising IDs — the unique device identifiers used to track a person’s activity and location — on government-issued devices.
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pressure → push → devices
The Navy also sent out a warning with “cyber threat hygiene recommendations,” advising that sailors limit social media activity and turn off location app access to phone cameras and location data on personal devices.
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sailors → send → devices
A later message from the acting secretary of the Navy called on personnel to “harden” their online profile and do the same for family members.
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message → act → members
Congressional scrutiny came when U.S. Central Command acknowledged to Congress in April the potential of “adversary exploitation of commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in theater.”
At the time, Centcom also confirmed military personnel were allowed to use personal devices in active areas of operation.
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personnel → come → operation
Since then, some units in high-risk areas have instituted turn-in and lock-away procedures, and stationed personnel have been warned to expect device confiscations.
The reassignment came as Vance and other Republicans have blamed the Iran war for the party’s sweeping losses in last week’s midterm elections.
Steps to limit information on government-issued devices are a good start, said Erik Wittreich, chief executive of Veilant, a secure-communications and private-network firm.
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Wittreich → institute → Veilant
But they are one part of what needs to become a “significant force protection mandate,” he said, rather than adjusting security after an attack.
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he → need → attack
“This has to be a part of mission planning, to be culturally adopted and shift the way we think about conducting operations in the future,” he said, noting that UTS involves “an assembly of sensors.”
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UTS → have → sensors
“It’s in our apps and our cellphones, but it’s not just our phone or our laptops,” he said.
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he → ’ → apps
“It’s the telematics in your vehicle, the smart thermostat in your condo, your house, your apartment.
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It → ’ → condo
It’s unclear how effective the messaging on security has been.
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messaging → ’ → security
In a September letter to the Pentagon, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rep. Pat Harrigan (R-N.C.) decried “the continued availability of commercial location data” from Pentagon facilities, citing the possibility that the information is coming from personal devices.
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information → decry → devices
Meanwhile, an August investigation by British broadcaster Sky News found more than 1,300 users of the fitness-tracking app Strava sharing routes and the timing of their workouts — more than seven years after the Pentagon flagged Strava as a potential security risk.
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Pentagon → find → risk
“You can’t get out of the UTS problem by telling thousands of military intelligence personnel or diplomats to never post that restaurant review or swipe on Tinder or call their family; it’s just not realistic,” said Justin Sherman, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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Sherman → get → Studies
Experts say that data, much of which is sold by brokers online, can be used to reveal a military base’s rhythm, including shift rotations and meal times.
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much → say → rotations
The Strava leaks could also be used to determine base layouts to a high degree of accuracy.
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leaks → use → accuracy
“You no longer need to hack a system,” Wittreich said.
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Wittreich → need → system
“You can go and buy the data.
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You → go → data
And that puts some of the responsibility back on us.”
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that → put → us
Part of the problem is that the U.S. military has operated some of its Middle Eastern bases for decades, confident that its adversaries were unable — or unwilling — to mount serious attacks.
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adversaries → operate → attacks
In Bahrain, for example, where the Navy has operated its main logistics hub since 1995, deployments for the some 9,000 people to what is known as Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain have been uneventful.
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what → operate → Activity
The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and conflict with the Iran-backed Houthis of Yemen have unsettled Saudi Arabia, a kingdom unused to conflicts playing out on home turf.
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war → back → turf
“People didn’t think about being stationed in Bahrain any differently than how they would in Norfolk or San Diego, from a security standpoint,” said John Cordle, a retired Navy captain who spent time at NSA Bahrain during his naval career and later as a contractor.
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who → think → contractor
He added that personnel on two-year deployments often brought their families with them on the assumption it was safe.
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it → add → assumption
That attitude seems to be reflected in some of the information available online about NSA Bahrain.
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attitude → seem → Bahrain
On Google Maps, users can pinpoint the base’s bowling alley, basketball and racquetball courts, galley and pier-side gym.
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users → pinpoint → alley
There are even reviews, with one user touting the gym’s “tons of equipment for your workouts” and posting a picture of a poster with its operating hours; other reviewers commend the galley for its “salad and fruit bar and fresh OJ.”
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reviewers → be → bar
And it’s not NSA Bahrain alone.
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it → ’ → ?
Similar posts can be found about other bases in the region, including Kuwait’s Camp Arifjan and Muwaffaq Al-Salti Air Base in Jordan.
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posts → find → Jordan
It’s likely the information proved useful to Iran, which targeted 26 U.S. military sites during the first six months of the war, along with hotels where U.S. personnel had been evacuated.
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personnel → ’ → hotels
Satellite imagery of the bases shows no random craters, indicating precision in targeting, according to Mark Cancian, a security expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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imagery → show → Studies
…and 18 more, not listed.